

IN THE MATTER OF:

THADDEUS SANCHEZ,

VS.

PORT AUTHORITY OF GUAM,

# BEFORE THE GUAM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS



ADVERSE ACTION APPEAL CASE NO. 14-AA21S

**DECISION AND JUDGMENT** 

## I. INTRODUCTION

Employee,

Management.

The above captioned and numbered Adverse Action Appeal came on before the Commission for a hearing on the Employee's Motion to grant his Appeal upon a violation of 4 GCA Section 4406, and the Port Authority of Guam Personnel Rules and Regulations ("PAGPRR"), Rule 11.307, on September 15, 2016. The Commission decided to consider the Motion without Oral Argument under Amended Adverse Action Appeal Rules of Procedure Rule 9.1. Persuaded that the Employee had demonstrated a procedural violation, the Commission voted 5-0 in favor of Employee.

OPICIMAL

Thaddeus Sanchez vs. PORT Case No. 14-AA21S Decision and Judgment

### II. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission is based upon the Organic Act of Guam, 4 G.C.A. §§ 4401, et seq., and relevant Personnel Rules and Regulations.

## III. RELEVANT FACTS

On July 15, 2014, Employee was served with a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action ("NPAA"). The NPAA was served prior to 5:00 P.M. on the 15<sup>th</sup>.

On July 25, 2014, Employee was served with a Notice of Final Adverse Action ("NFAA"). Employee was served with the NFAA at approximately 7:00 P.M. The Port Authority of Guam's Business Office closes at 5:00 P.M.

## IV. <u>ANALYSIS</u>

PAGPRR Rule 11.307 provides in relevant part that when an employee is served with a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action they are: "entitled to seek reconsideration of the proposed adverse action by answering any charges within 10 days after receipt of the notice." Derived from similar rules, including the old Department of Administration Rule 14.22, PAGPRR Rule 11.307 goes on to say: "The entire 10 days for the employee to respond to the notice of proposed adverse action must expire before a final notice of adverse action is issued."

The Port musters two arguments to counter the motion.

First, the Port contends that the 10 day period should be counted by hours. In other words, 10 days is equivalent to 240 hours. Since Sanchez was served with the NPAA prior to 5 P.M. on the 15<sup>th</sup> and the NFAA after 5 P.M. on the 25<sup>th</sup>, the Port argues that 240 hours elapsed, thus satisfying the requirement of Rule 11.307.

Second, the Port argues that because the Business Office closed at 5 P.M., the opportunity for Sanchez to answer the NPAA had passed. That Sanchez was served with the NFAA at 7 P.M., after the Business Office closed, should be allowable, since (the Port suggests) Sanchez could not reasonably respond to the NPAA any longer.

We observe that it appears to be highly unusual to interpret a rule or statute that provides a number of days in terms of hours, as the Port suggests. The Port does not cite any precedent or point to any rule or statute that suggests that 10 days should be treated as 240 hours. In fact, there is not even a case or rule from another jurisdiction provided that suggests this is the proper approach.

In Guam Waterworks Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Mesngon), 2014 Guam 35 ¶13, the Supreme Court of Guam applied 1 GCA § 709 to interpreting rules where no other computation formula is provided.

§ 709 states: "The time within which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a Saturday or holiday, and then it is also excluded."

If we apply § 709 to the facts of this case, it does not matter how many hours went by. Section 709 does not suggest breaking days into hours. Instead, July 15<sup>th</sup>, the day it was served, is excluded from the calculation; therefore, it does not matter what time the NPAA was served on July 15<sup>th</sup>. Day 1 begins on July 16<sup>th</sup> and Day 10 is July 25<sup>th</sup>.

We further note that Rule 11.307 says: "The entire 10 days for the employee to respond to the notice of proposed adverse action must expire before a final notice of adverse action is issued" (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the words in the rule do not provide for service on the 10<sup>th</sup> day once a business office closes. Perhaps Sanchez planned to write an answer and slip it under the door of the Business Office, possibly he was going to send an email or text

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

message to a Supervisor in the five hours that remained in the tenth day, or maybe he even planned to knock on the door of a Manager. We don't know for sure, but the point remains that those options were foreclosed by the service of the NFAA before the 10<sup>th</sup> day had fully expired.

The ten (10) day answering period is taken seriously by the Commission:

"The Commission has consistently ruled this to be a fundamental right in the adverse action process. This right is vested exclusively in the employee, and may only be invoked by the employee. When management issues a proposed adverse action notice, it should reasonably expect that the employee, in preparation, may answer any time from the first to the tenth day. Management has no alternative but to await Appellant's response, or the expiration of the tenth day, if there is no response; thereafter, and only then, may final adverse action be taken." Quinata v. Dept. of Correction, CY93-AA05, Page 3. See also, Aflague v. Dept. of Corrections, CY96-AA04; Gutierrez v. Dept. of Youth Affairs, CY89-AA08.

V.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Accordingly, the Commission after due deliberation has determined unanimously that Management did violate the 10 Day Rule and PAG Personnel Rules and Regulations Section 11.307. The Commission finds for the Employee, and his Adverse Action Appeal is hereby granted. Employee is due all back-pay and benefits lost as a result of his suspension.

SO ADJUDGED THIS 10th DAY OF November 2016.

EDITH PANGELINAN

Chairperson

PRISCILLA T. TUNCA P

Commissioner

LOURDES HONGYEE

Commissioner

DANIEL D'LEON GUBRRERO

Vice-Chairperson

JOHA SMITH

Commissioner

CATHERINE GAYLE

Commissioner

Thaddeus Sanchez vs. PORT Case No. 14-AA21S Decision and Judgment