BEFORE THE GUAM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS



IN THE MATTER OF:

FRANKLIN S. FEJARAN,

Employee,

VS.

GUAM POWER AUTHORITY,

Management.

ADVERSE ACTION APPEAL **CASE NO.: 15-AA05T**

DECISION AND ORDER

This case came before the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") at its regularly scheduled meeting on August 18, 2015, at 5:45 p.m., at its office located in Sinajana, Guam. Franklin Fejaran ("Employee") was present with his attorney, Daniel S. Somerfleck. Present for Management was Julie Quinata, and D. Graham Botha, GPA Legal Counsel, was present and represented Management.

I. **ISSUE**

Did Employee meet his burden of proof under CSC AAR 9 regarding his Motion to Revoke for Procedural Defect filed with the Civil Service Commission?

II. **HOLDING**

After considering the pleadings and the arguments of counsel, the CSC finds that Employee did not meet his burden of proof relating to his Motion to Revoke the adverse action for procedural

Franklin Fejaran vs GPA Adverse Action Appeal 15-AA05T Page 1 of 3

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Franklin Fejaran vs GPA Adverse Action Appeal 15-AA05T

defect. The CSC finds that Management gave notice as required under 4 G.C.A. §4406, and that there were no procedural defects.

III. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission is based upon the Organic Act of Guam, 4 G.C.A. §4401, et seq., and the personnel rules and regulations.

IV. DISCUSSION

Employee has cited *Guam Hous. Corp. v. Guam Civil Serv. Com'm* (Potter), 2015 Guam 22, where the Commission revoked an adverse action for failure to provide specific details in the notices. This case is distinguishable from *Potter* in many respects. First, in *Potter*, neither the NPAA nor the NFAA were sufficiently specific in detail. In this case, it is not disputed that GPA provided detailed facts in the NPAA. Second, in Potter, after receiving the vague NPAA, that Employee approached Management during the ten (10) day window to attempt to resolve the matter. A subsequent vague NFAA left Potter unable to determine which, if any, parts of his defense were accepted. Here, Fejaran did not mount any defense, oral or written, to the allegations in the NPAA; thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the detailed allegations in the NPAA did not spontaneously vary in the absence of a defense.

Perhaps most significant are the nature of the charges. In *Potter*, Employee was accused of sexual harassment: an allegation that can require more specific details. Who, where, when, and specifically what are more important questions, and saying, "On or about September 2010... you hugged her and touched her inappropriately," leaves a wide variety of factual scenarios. Particularly since a third party was involved, Management should more likely to be required to include specific allegations by the accuser for Employee to be able to intelligently respond in defense. As a rule of thumb, Management should not rely on "he knows what he did" approaches to NPAAs or NFAAs.

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Yet, here, Fejaran simply stopped going to work. Not only did he stop showing up for work, he failed to communicate with his supervisors regarding the absences. Frankly, there are only so many ways to state that someone has stopped showing up for work. Absence from work is not an allegation that cries out for significant details. The NFAA states multiple times that Employee is being terminated for failure to show up for work and failure to communicate with supervisors. Certainly, it would have been more correct for GPA to have listed the specific dates they had in mind in the NFAA and draft the NFAA fully independent of the NPAA. Had there been different charges, it might have cost Management their adverse action; however, under the circumstances of this case, it appears permissible. It would be absurd to allow Employee to prevail in this motion because he missed so many consecutive days of work that he cannot tell which ones he was terminated for missing.

V. CONCLUSION

By a vote of 6-1, the Commission denies Employee's Motion to Revoke the adverse action. Employee failed to meet his burden of proof. The matter shall proceed to a merit hearing.

SO ADJUDGED THIS 3rd DAY OF November 2016.

EDITH PANGELINAN

Chairperson

PRISCILLA T. TUNCA P

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LOURDES HONGYEE

Commissioner

DANTELD, LEON GRERRERO

Vice-Chairperson

JOHN SMITH

Commissioner

CATHERINE GAYLE

Commissioner

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